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INTRODUCTION*
Joseph P. Tomain'"
I want to thank Professor Julian Wuerth of the University of
Cincinnati Philosophy Department, and also the University of
Cincinnati Law Review, for organizing this important symposium. It is
not often that the College of Law hosts the world's foremost legal
philosopher, as well as litigants on both sides of what has already proven
to be one of the most important United States Supreme Court cases in
history.
There will be no shortage of commentary about Grutler v. Bollingerl and
Gratz v. Bollinger, 2 particularly as the country celebrates the fiftieth
anniversary of Brown v. Board ofEducation. 3 Indeed, it cannot be gainsaid
that our country has failed to settle the issue of racial segregation in its
schools since Brown. Nor can it be gainsaid that Bakke"' has failed to settle
the issue of affirmative action in higher education. The legacies ofBrown
and Bakke, sadly, remain. Our country continues to struggle with the
matter of race, and it no doubt will for some time to come; likely longer
than the next twenty-five years. 5

* On June 23, 2003, the United States Supreme Court decided two landmark cases on affirmative
action, Cruller v. Bollinger and Gral<. v, Bollinger. In both decisions, the Court resoundingly endorsed the use of
racial differences in university admission policies. It did so, however, while simultaneously striking down the
specific implementation of this policy at the University ofl'vlichigan's undergraduate college and validating
the admissions policy at Michigan's Law School. In response to these watershed cases, the University of
Cincinnati College of Law and the University of Cincinnati Law Review sponsored a symposium entitled
"Law, Ethics, and Affirmative Action in America."
The symposium, held October 7, 2003, reunited the principal legal architects on the opposing
ends of Cruller and GraJ<., Ki~k O. Kolbo and Mar.;n Krislov, for their first public appearance together since
the Supreme Court's decisions. The event also featured prominent legal commentators, including keynote
speaker Ronald Dworki'1, professor of philosophy Robert B. 'Nestmoreland, and professor of law Vema L.
Williams.
.
To
view
an
archived
webcast
of the
symposium,
please
visit
http://www.law.uc.edu/current/aa031007 /.
** Joseph P. Tomain is the Dean and Nippert Professor of Law at the University of Cincinnati
College of Law.
I. 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003).
2. 123 S. Ct. 2411 (2003).
3. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
4. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. \'. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
5. The reference is toJustice O'Connor's statement, or aspiration, that matters of affirmative action
in higher education should be settled in 25 years, even while recognizing that Bakke was decided twenty-five
years before: "It has been 25 years since Justice Powell first approved the use of race to further an interest
in student body diversity in the context of public higher education. Since that time, the number of minority
applicants ,,;th high grades and test scores has indeed increased. ; .. We expect that 25 years from now, the
use of racial preferences will no longer be necessary to further the interest approved today." Cruller, 123 S .
. Ct. at 2346-47.
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Justice O'Connor's prediction may be overly optimistic. It may also
be aspirational, a goal which we all can hope to achieve. As a society,
wecan only wish that Justice O'Connor is correct, but one wonders.
The twenty-five-year timetable is unfortunately unrealistic because of
the depth of the divide between us, and the difficulty of reaching racial
reconciliation in America today.
Of course, the Cruller opinion affecting public law school admissions
hits close to home, and the following comments are about that case
rather than its companion. Cruller should have been a simple opinion;
it should have been an easy opinion; and yet it was not. The rhetoric
and language that we use to address race is difficult, if not tortured. Let
me dispose of why I believe that Cruller should have been simple and
easy, and then go on to discuss the tricky language in the case. The
Articles contained in this Symposium Edition should help enrich our
understanding of those concepts.
Cruller should have been an easy case because it is so obviously
consistent with Bakke. The only reason the country needed to revisit
Bakke is the rise of affirmative action opponents, not because of any
change in fundamental law. Lower court opinions in the Fifth, Sixth,
and Ninth Circuits6 demonstrate how aggressively affirmative action's
opponents scrutinized Bakke for fissures and gaps. Justice Powell's
opinion in Bakke was subjected to scrutiny worthy of Talmudic exegetes.
Therefore,Justice O'Connor's reaffirmation of Bakke is extraordinarily
important. Justice O'Connor made it clear that Bakke is the law of the
land, tortured readings notwithstanding. Its reaffirmation, and, I hope,
its enduring significance, can help us understand and find common
ground with regard to affirmative action in higher education. 7
An ancillary yet important point is that Justice O'Connor's majority
opinion recognizes the importance of judicial deference in matters of
university admissions, the type of deference that courts once gave to
universities as a matter of course. Justice O'Connor says in general that
"universities occupy a special niche in our constitutional tradition.,,8
Her opinion then goes on to argue specifically, quoting from Bakke, that
"[t]he freedom ofa university to make its own judgments as to education includes the selection of its student body."g Thankfully, that
principle has been reaffirmed by the Court.

6. See, e.g., Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996); Grutter v. Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732 (6th
Cir. 2002); Smith \". Univ. Wash. Law School, 233 F.3d 1188 (9th Cir. 2000).
7. Cruller, 123 S. Ct. at 2337.
8. /d. at 2339.
9. /d.

of
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Grutter should have been an easy decision because the enduring
significance of Sweattv. Painter lO is also recognized .. If it was wrong to
exclude Mrican-Arnerican law .students from majority law school
classrooms in 1950, is it any better to have them underrepresented in
2004? The significance of professional schools in general, and law
schools in particular, for the cultivation of leaders in our society was
recognized in Sweatt and then reaffirmed in. Grutter:
In order to cultivate a set ofleaders with legitimacy in the eyes of the
citizenry, it is necessary that the path to leadership be visibly open to
talented and qualified individuals of every .race and ethnicity. All
members of our heterogeneous society must have confidence in the
openness and integrity of the educational institutions that provide this'
training. As we have recognized, law schools "cannot be effective in
isolation from the individuals and institutions with which the law
interacts." Access to legal education (and thus the legal profession)
must be inclusive of talented and qualified individuals of every race
and ethnicity, so that all members of our heterogeneous society may
participate in the educational institutiClns that provide the training and
education necessary to succeed in America. I I

Like Bakke, Sweatt was and is the law of the land, even though we seem
to have had temporary amnesia abo~t that fact.
Now we reach the point where law and rhetoric meet on troubled
grounds. I want to discuss two examples where the vocabulary of race
fails us. The matter of "critical mass" is one; the matter of the
"educational benefits of diversity" is the other. In both instances,
neither side of the argument accurately qr adequately defines the issues.
Without usef~l definitions, citizens cannot engage in the meaningful
discussion required for our nation to one day. reach resolution and
acceptance. Our continued failure to find a common language is
precisely wh~t makes Justice O'Connor's "25-year" dicta unrealistic.
To anticipate my conclusion, the failure is real because the stakes are so
very high-Grutter, no less so than Gratz, is about the racial division of
wealth and power in our country and the consequences of that division.
Both sides can be faulted for failing to articulate with clarity and
specificity the nature of the fight. It may very well be the case that-as
a society and as individuals-we cannot be as honest as we would like
to be on matters of race, so we resort to rhetoric to help us live with and
think about these deep issues. First is the issue of "critical mass."
Affirmative action advocates will do all they can to avoid uttering the

10. 339 U.S. 629 (\950).
II. Grut/er, 123 S. Ct. at2341 (citation omitted).
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most dreaded of all five letter words~quota .. For to admit that an
admissions plan has an implicit or explicit quota is to doom that plan in
the eyes of the law. 12 As a result, in the Crutler litigation, the phrase
"critical mass" was used as a way to avoid the death shoals of quotas. 13
"Critical mass," however, is nota mere litigation strategy or trick, it
has real substantive content-people do not live happily in isolation.
Like-minded .people are comfortable with the like,.minded, are challenged by the other-minded, and flourish with both. For "like-minded,"
feel free to read "like-experienced" or, more awkwardly, "similarly
experienced." The intent of these synonymous phrases is to encompass
race, gender, ethnicity, culture, and the like, as well as upbringing and
background.
The heart of the matter is quite precisely that tokenism helps no one,
neither majority nor minority. Full learning cannot take place within
either group alone-both are needed. The lone minority in the
classroom struggles too much with what is said and unsaid, and such
psychological pressure should· be put on no one under any circumstances. And yet, what is critical mass other than a sufficient number of
persons of like experience who can share with each other and attain a
level of comfort in an institution that allows and encourages learning to
take place from others?
At one level, the distinction between "quota" and "critical mass" is
semantic: both refer to some designation, size, or number of persons in
. a larger group. Yet, as we have learned, the distinction is of constitutional significance-quotas are taboo; critical mass is legitimate. 14 Even
this constitutional dimension requires fuller articulation.
We argue so vociferously about this matter because it is so deep and
so difficult. Having said as much, however, it is just plain wrong not
only as a matter oflegal style but morally to dismiss the issue of critical
mass as "mystical;" so much so that it "challenges even the most gullible
mind."15 Indeed, it would seem that at least five of Justice Scalia's
colleagues had such gullible minds. It is not gullibility about which we
fight. It is about the nature of the good.
Both sides of the critical mass controversy can be faulted. The
Petitioners argued that critical mass and quotas are indistinguishable
and they said that to argue that they are distinguishable is essentially
dishonest. 16 The Respondents argued that the Petitioners dishonestly

12 ..
13.
14.
15.
16.

See id. at 2342 ("[Aj race-conscious admissions program cannot use a quota system.").
/d. at 2341.
Id. at 2342-43.
/d. at 2348 (Scalia,]., dissenting).
See Petitioners' Reply Brief at 14, Gruner\". Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003) (No. 02-241).
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distorted the word "quotas.,,17 The history of quotas in higher education is that quotas have been used as exclusionary devices to limit the
number ofJewish persons who sought admission to large, elite, private
universities in the 19l0s and 1920s.1 8 Quotas are a means of exclusion,
not inclusion. Is it not more accurate, and honest, to say that critical
mass and quotas are similar concepts and can pass constitutional muster
when, and only when, they ilre not harmful to a suspect class?
Even if we equate quotas with critical mass, neither was the reason
Barbara Grutter was not accepted into the University of Michigan
School of Law. The reason Barbara Grutter did not get into the
University of Michigan Law School was not because of exclusionary
racial classification. Rather, she w~s denied admission because she did
not have an application, grades and all, acceptable to the University of
Michigan Law School-period.
Embedded in this whole issue of admissions is the question of
"lowering standards." This is an argument that cannot be taken too far.
Does a law school "lower standards" when it admits one student with an
LSAT score of 170 and another student with a score of 165? Presumably, "standards" have been lowered. What if the student with the 165
LSAT score was from Yaak, Montana, or was the captain of a national
championship football team, or was a ballerina, or was the son of the
president of the United States, or the daughter of a major donor of the
university? Have standards been lowered? In each case? These are
tired examples emphasizing as they do geography, extracurricular
activities, and "connections." Yet, these examples are telling in two
ways. First, they "lower standards" as affirmative action opponents
claim-but onlynarrQwed to the issue of quantifiable test scores.
Second, they are constitutionally inapposite because they avoid the
fateful word "race."
For now, affirmative action opponents have captured the constitutional and societal rhetoric on this issue. They are happy to trot out
Justice Harlan's dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson and wave the flag of colorblindness. 19 They attempt to champion racial equality regardless of
effects or consequences on minorities of continuing racial classifications.
But this flag-waving touches the central point: our racial vocabulary has
been insufficient to point out that Harlan's dissent was also about

17. See Brieffor RespondentsJames et. al. at 31, Grutte~ \'. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003) (No.
02-241).
18. See Lani Guinier, Admissions Rituals as Political Acts: Guardians at the Gates ifour Democratic Ideals, 117
HARV. L. REV. 113,.127-28 (2003).
.
19. See Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2365 (Thomas,]., dissenting) (quoting Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537,
559 (1896) (Harlan,]., dissenting)).
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exclusion, and that exclusion of persons for reasons specified, including
race, is unacceptable in a pluralistic democracy.
This matter of language surrounding quotas and critical mass
encompasses a signifi:cantly deeper problem. Specifically, the legal
standard that is applied when reviewing cases of racial segregation first
lDoks to. the matter of whether Dr not the rule Dr practice under review
cDnstitutes a racial classification. If so, then that classification faces a
nearly insurmDuntable burden even to the point of ignoring the injuries
that may be caused by the classification itself.20 We might be better
served ifwe recall President LyndonJohnson's 1965 Howard University
commencement address entitled "To Fulfill These Rights," where he
said:
You do not take a person who, for years, has been hobbled by chains
and liberate him, bring him up to the starting line of a race and say,
"you are free to compete with all the others" and still justly believe
that you have been completely fair. 21

The anticlassification standard is the starting line, it is not fairness per
se.
Affinnative actiDn prDpDnents, however, are not free from criticism
either, and are peculiarly silent about the long-term consequences of
continuing to make racialdistinctiDns. Stigmatization, continued racial
sensitivity, and program proliferation are nDt insubstantial by-products.
Both sides lack an adequate vocabulary to' understand the relationship
between. rac:::e and the Constitution. Then again, our system of
cDnstitutional justice enables deep moral disagreements to be aired,
resDlved, and revised accordingly.22 It seems, however, that the
cDntroversy Dver race has been with us all of our lives with no end in
sight.
.
Language also. fails us in the discussion of the "educational benefits of
diversity" that fDrms the heart of the University's case 23 and comes
under particular attack byJustice Antonin Scalia. Justice Scalia's attack
comes in a specialway. His attacks on the nature of teaching simply are
nDt credible:

20. See Frank 1.1'vIichelman, Reasonable Umbrage: Rru:eand ConstilutionalAntidiscrimination Law in the United
States and South Africa, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1378 (2004); Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination and
Anticlassi.fication Values in Constitutional Struggles Over Brown, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1470 (2004).
21. LyndonJohnson, To Fulfill These Rights, quoted in RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLEJUSTICE: THE
HISTORY OF BROIiw V. BOARD OF EDUCA110NAND BL-\CK AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 759 (rev.
ed.2004).
22. STUART HAMPSHIRE,JUSTICE IS CO"ruCT 94-98 (2000).
23. See general!:;, WiLLIA~1 G. BOWE" & DEREK BOK, THE SHAPE OF THE RIVER: LONG-TERM
CONSEQUENCES OF CO!'<SIDERING RACE IN COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY AmllSSIONS (1998).
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For it is a lesson of life rather than law-essentially the same lesson
taught to (or rather learned by, for it cannot be "taught" in the usual
sense) people three feet shorter and twenty years younger than the fullgrown adults at the University of Michigan Law School, in institutions
ranging from Boy Scout troops to public-school kindergartens. If
properly considered an "educational benefit" at all, it is surely not one
that is either uniquely relevant to law school or uniquely "teachable"
in a formal educational setting. And therifOre: Ifit is appropriate for the
University of Michigan Law School to use racial discrimination for the
purpose of putting together a "critical mass" that will convey generic
lessons in socialization and good citizenship, surely it is no less
appropriate-indeed, particularlY appropriate-for' the civil serVice
system of the State of Michigan to do so. There, also, those exposed
to "critical masses" of certain. races will presumably become better
Americans, better Michiganders, better civil' servants. And surely
private employers cannot be criticized-indeed, should be praised-if
they also "teach" good citizenship to their adult employees through a
patriotic, all-American system of racial discrimination in hiring. The
nonminority individuals who are deprived of a legal education, civil
service job, or any job at all by reason of their skin color will surely
understand. 24

a

Let's avoid the jurisprudence of sarcasm inherent in that quotation and
talk about teaching, learning, and educational benefits. And ifit is too
harsh a criticism to hl.belJustice Scalia's approach as sarcastic, then let's
accept it as a skeptic's position.
Justice Scalia makes the point that diversity education cannot be
taught "in the usual sense" and that it is not "uniquely 'teachable' in a
formal educational setting." These points are troubling, coming as they,
do from a former law teacher who should know better and whose
qualifications "in the usual sense" and "uniquely" add nothing distinguishing to his criticism. For what is it we do in law school "in the usual
sense" or otherwise? Do we .teach values? Do we teach politics? Do we
teach analYsis? Do we teach thinking? What is it we do in universities?
Do we teach knowledge? Do we teach wisdom? Do we teach information
and data? If by "teach" we mean inculcate, or force feed, or pour into
the mind of a student values, beliefs, norms, analysis, ability to think,
and the like, then no teacher "teaches" and we should admit it. But if
"teach" means to create an environment and design curricula and
education settings that allow people to discuss values, politics, analysis,
culture, and philosophy in the hope that knowledge and wisdom will be
attained through processes of conversation, debate, and reflection, then

24. Gruffer, 123 S. Ct. at 2349 (Scalia,]., dissenting).
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yes we do teach. In exacdy the same way we can and do teach diversity
and the educational benefits thereof. By making diversity a part of a
school's curriculum, by allowing students to discuss it openly in a safe
educational environment, and by saying that diversity is a matter worthy
of discussion and consideration, we are thus teaching by awakening in
students the cultural values central to Brown. 25 Such discussion is not
something that just affects gullible minds. Moreover, and perhaps more
significandy, the "educational benefits of diversity" are inherent in noncurricular academic programming, social activities, interest groups, and
by simply just living together.
Let us assume, arguendo, thatJustice Scalia's point about education "in
the usual sense" is intended to encompass non-academic learning and
teaching. The consequence of this position is that nonacademic
learning and teaching cannot count as a compelling factor when
undergoing constitutional scrutiny. Let us go further and say that the
nonacademic category might include what today is called networking,
the development of a different set of expectations about education, the
development of different attitudes about education, the experience of a
different environment, the development of a different sense of self given
a new environment, and the like. Assuming that this list and other
similar items come under the heading of nonacademic, then the
question, it seems to me, should be appropriately posed as: If such
nonacademic learning and education does not take place in school, then
where does it happen and when does it occur?
,
Justice Scalia's skepticism seems to be based on the assumption that
racial groups come to each other with hardened predispositions that
preclude such teaching or learning. Believing that people with different
backgrounds cannot learn from others is twice self-defeating. First, if
Justice Scalia is right that teaching cannot take place because people are
predisposed to their own views, then affirmative action is necessary
precisely to overcome a narrow-mindedness which reproduces those in
power and which walls-out minorities. Justice Scalia's assumption about
. racial predispositions proves the University's case. It does not defeat it.
The second way that Scalia's argument is self-defeating is that his
skepticism about predisposition proves too much. If people are
predisposed on matters of race in such a way that they cannot be taught

25. "Today, education is perhaps the most iinportant function of state and local governments ...
today it is a principle instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, and preparing him for later
professional training, and in helping him adjust normally to his environment. And these days, it is doubtful
that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life ifhe is denied the opportunity of an education.
Such an opportunity, where the state has undertaken'to provide it, is right which must be made available
to all on equal terms." Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).

a
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"in the usual sense' or "uniquely," then how is it that persons who are
disposed to believe other things can be taught? Can a person predisposed to utilitarianism be taught non-consequentialist philosophy? Can
a person predisposed to believe in laissez-faire be taught anything about
distributivist policies? Was Mill not exactly correct in arguing that our
beliefs must be subjected to criticism and thought and testing before
they stagnate?26 Indeed, this symposium was organized in order for
litigants and scholars from all sides to speak, address, and inform, and
to allow us to test our own predispositions against the ideas of others.
This very symposium is an occasion for teaching. It gives lie to Justice
Scalia's skepticism.
To conclude, our rhetorical difficulties are evidence of the high stakes
of race in America, and the real reason for affirmative action are at least
twofold. First, this is an opportunity for the educational benefits of
diversity to be real, not feigned. It is an opportunity for individuals to
recognize each other, to appreciate their breadth and the uniqueness of
all human experience, including cultural, racial, and class understandings. It is an opportunity for learning and teaching to take place. This
reason for affirmative action is, in Martha Nussbaum's phrase, "the
cultivation ofhumanity."27 Indeed, anyone who believes in the value of
the life of the mind believes in diversity of views and values, racial and
otherwise. Diversity allows us to think beyond our boundaries, beyond
our experiences; it allows us to think about the other and others.
The second, and perhaps the most frightening and difficult aspect of
affirmative action-·and I believe that fairness demands that we be frank
about this-is that affirmative action is about political participation, and
political participation is about sharing wealth and power. Our country
cannot prosper as a nation divided in two-one part black, one part
white, with continuing income and educational disparities. In Lani
Guinier's words, univershy admissions are, in fact, "political acts" and
democratic ones at that. 28
If for no other reason than a sharing of wealth and power in our
society we must be committed to affirmative action as part of our
national agenda. Both of these ideas, the cultivation of humanity and
the participation in political society, are moral principles. They are also
principles of social justice. Understanding those principles, their
individual and social contexts as well as in their historic and global

26. JOH;\; STUART MILL, o;\; LIBERTY, ch. 2 (Gertrude Himmelfarb ed., 1974).
27. See l'\'IARTHA C. NUSSBAU~I, CULTIVATI;\;G HU~IA;\;ITY: A CLO\SSICAL DEFE;\;SE OF REFOR~I
I;\; LIBERAL EnUCATIO;\;, ch. 5 (1997).
28. Guinier, supra note 18, at 135.
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contexts, are what we try to understand and what we explore in
universities. These are the things, as educators, that we should be doing.
Affirmative action is about the heart and soul of America, involving
as it does law, politics, policy, philosophy, and moral judgment. It
would seem then that this symposium itself is testament to the educational benefits of diversity as we explore each of those facets of the
problem. Lawyers can learn from Marvin Krislov's and Kirk Kolbo's
analyses of the law and policy behind the law school's admissions
process at the University of Michigan. Lawyers and students can also
learn from Professor Westmoreland and Professor Dworkin as they look
at the philosophy and policy of arguments behind the affirmative action.
Finally, we can all learn the moral dimensions of balancing race and
diversity from Professor Thomas .. In precisely these several ways, this
symposIUm proves the claim that educational benefits derive from
diversity.
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